We examine an auction model where there are many different goods, each good has multiple units, and bidders have gross substitutes valuations over the goods. We analyze the number of iterations in iterative auction algorithms for the model based on the theory of discrete convex analysis. By making use of L ♮ -convexity of the Lyapunov function we derive exact bounds on the number of iterations in terms of the ℓ ∞ -distance between the initial price vector and the found equilibrium. Our results extend and unify the price adjustment algorithms of Ausubel (2006) and other existing algorithms for the unit-demand auction models, offering computational complexity results for these algorithms, and reinforcing the connection between auction theory and discrete convex analysis.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a growing use of iterative auctions for selling items such as spectrum licenses in telecommunication, electrical power, landing slots at airports, etc. (see Blumrosen and Nisan (2007) ; Cramton et al. (2006) for surveys). In such auctions, given a set of discrete (or indivisible) items the auctioneer aims at finding an efficient allocation of items to bidders as well as market clearing prices of the items.
In this paper, we consider a model where there are multiple indivisible goods for sale and each good may have several units; this is more general than the single-unit model treated extensively in the literature. We are particularly interested in precise time bounds of iterative auctions. Theoretical bounds on the number of iterations are interesting in their own right but also important in practice, providing market participants with an a priori guarantee for the time required to execute a planned auction. While computer simulations are often used to evaluate the practical performance of iterative auctions (see, e.g., Bichler et al. (2009) ; Parkes and Ungar (2000) ), there are only a few scattered results on theoretical analysis of the time complexity so far (see, e.g., Andersson and Erlanson (2013) ).
The objective of this paper is to provide a unified method of analysis for iterative auctions based on the theory of discrete convex analysis. Our contribution consists of the following two aspects.
In the multi-unit auction model with gross substitutes valuations, Ausubel (2006) proposed several iterative auctions, all of which are based on minimization of a function called the Lyapunov function. Our first contribution is to reveal a nice combinatorial property of the Lyapunov function-discrete convexity (L ♮ -convexity), and analyze the number of iterations required in iterative auctions by utilizing the theory of discrete convex analysis. We give the exact bounds for the ascending and descending auctions in Ausubel (2006) and their variants in terms of the ℓ ∞ -distance between the initial price vector and the equilibrium price vector (see Theorems 4.7, 4.8, 4.10, and 4.11) . This implies, in particular, that the trajectory of the price vector generated by the ascending or descending auction is the "shortest" path between the initial vector and the equilibrium price vector. This result also exhibits an appealing feature of the ascending and descending auctions. Another iterative auction named the two-phase auction, consisting of a single ascending phase and a single descending phase, is also considered in this paper (see Theorems 4.12 and 4.13 and Remark 4.14).
Our second contribution is concerned with the unit-demand auction model in the sense that each bidder is interested in getting at most one item. Iterative auctions for this model are discussed extensively in the literature (see, e.g., ; Andersson and Erlanson (2013) ; Demange et al. (1986) ; Mishra and Parkes (2009) ; Mo et al. (1988) ; Sankaran (1994) ). Specifically, Vickrey-English auction by Demange et al. (1986) , unit-demand auction single-unit auction with GS valuations multi-unit auction with SGS valuations Vickrey-Dutch auction by Mishra and Parkes (2009) , and Vickrey-EnglishDutch auction by Andersson and Erlanson (2013) are such iterative auctions. These three algorithms are proposed independently of the iterative auction algorithms for the multi-unit model. We offer a unified treatment of these iterative auction algorithms by revealing their relationship to the general iterative auction algorithms for the general model. In particular, we show that the sequence of price vectors generated by Vickrey-English auction (resp., Vickrey-Dutch auction) coincides with that generated by an ascending auction (resp., a descending auction) when applied to unitdemand auctions. This observation, combined with our first contribution described above, yields immediately the known bounds for the number of iterations in Vickrey-English auction and Vickrey-Dutch auction. A new bound for Vickrey-English-Dutch auction is obtained from our result for the two-phase auction algorithm above.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we explain auction models and fundamental concepts used in this paper. In Section 3 we review the concept of discrete convexity and some fundamental results in discrete convex analysis. In Section 4, we analyze the number of iterations required in iterative auctions in the multi-unit model with gross substitutes valuations, while iterative auction algorithms for the unit-demand auctions are discussed in Section 5.
Fundamental Concepts in Auctions
We explain auction models and fundamental concepts used in this paper.
Auction Models and Walrasian Equilibrium.
In the auction market, there are n types of items or goods, denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and m bidders, denoted by M = {1, 2, . . . , m}. We have u(i) units available for each item i ∈ N , where u(i) is a positive integer. We denote the integer interval as [0, u] Z = {x ∈ Z n | 0 ≤ x ≤ u}, where u = (u(1), u(2), . . . , u(n)) ⊤ . Each vector x ∈ [0, u] Z is called a bundle; a bundle x = (x(1), x(2), . . . , x(n)) ⊤ corresponds to a (multi-)set of items, where x(i) represents the multiplicity of item i ∈ N . Each bidder j ∈ M has his valuation function f j : [0, u] Z → R; the number f j (x) represents the value of the bundle x worth to bidder j. The case with u(i) = 1 (i ∈ N ) is referred to as single-unit auction in this paper, while the case with general u as multi-unit auction. Note that [0, 1] Z = {0, 1} n , where 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ⊤ . A further special case where each bidder is interested in getting at most one item is called unit-demand auction; see Section 5 for more detailed description of this auction model. The relationship among the three auction models is summarized in Figure 1 .
In an auction, we want to find an efficient allocation and market clearing prices. An allocation of items is defined as a set of bundles
Given a price vector p ∈ R n + , each bidder j ∈ M wants to have a bundle x which maximizes the value
We call the function V j : R n + → R and the set D j (p) ⊆ [0, u] Z the indirect utility function and the demand set, respectively. The auctioneer wants to find a pair of a price vector p * and an allocation
This pair is called a (Walrasian) equilibrium; p * is a (Walrasian) equilibrium price vector (see, e.g., Blumrosen and Nisan (2007) ; Cramton et al. (2006) ). Thus, in an equilibrium every bidder gets an optimal bundle for himself and all goods are sold; i.e., all market participants are in harmony.
Although the Walrasian equilibrium possesses a variety of desirable properties, it does not always exist. Hence, some assumption for bidders' valuation functions is required to guarantee the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium.
Gross Substitutes Condition and Discrete Concavity.
We say that function f j satisfies the gross substitutes (GS) condition if it satisfies the following:
This condition means that when prices of some items increase, the only items that may drop from the optimal bundle are those with increased prices. The GS condition is originally introduced by Kelso and Crawford (1982) for valuation functions defined on 0-1 vectors in the setting of a fairly general two-sided job matching model. Since then, this condition has been widely used in various models such as matching, housing, and labor markets (see, e.g., Ausubel (2006) ; Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) ; Bing et al. (2004) ; Blumrosen and Nisan (2007); Cramton et al. (2006) ; Stacchetti (1999, 2000) ; Lehmann et al. (2006) ).
Various characterizations of GS condition are given in the literature of discrete convex analysis and auction theory (Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) ; Fujishige and Yang (2003) ; Stacchetti (1999, 2000) ). Among others, Fujishige and Yang (2003) revealed the relationship between GS condition and discrete concavity called M ♮ -concavity (see Section 3.1 for the definition). The concept of M ♮ -concave function is introduced by Murota and Shioura (1999) , independently of GS condition, as a class of discrete concave functions. It is an extension of the concept of M-concave function introduced by Murota (1996) . The concepts of M ♮ -concavity/M-concavity play primary roles in the theory of discrete convex analysis ).
It is shown by Fujishige and Yang (2003) that GS condition and M ♮ -concavity are equivalent in the case of single-unit auction.
Theorem 2.1 (Fujishige and Yang (2003) 
vectors satisfies the GS condition if and only if it is an M ♮ -concave function.
This result initiated a strong interaction between discrete convex analysis and auction theory; the results obtained in discrete convex analysis are used in auction theory (Bing et al. (2004) ; Lehmann et al. (2006) , etc.), while auction theory provides discrete convex analysis with interesting applications (see, e.g., Murota and Tamura (2003) ).
It is known that in single-unit auctions, a Walrasian equilibrium does exist if bidder's valuation functions satisfy the GS condition. The GS condition, however, is not sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium in multiunit auctions. In the last decade, several papers independently tried to identify conditions for valuation functions to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in a multi-unit auction. Murota and Tamura (2003) proposed a stronger version of GS condition by using the relationship with M ♮ -concavity, and proved the existence of an equilibrium in a more general setting (see also Murota (2003, Chapter 11)) .
In this paper, we use the strong gross substitutes (SGS) condition given by Milgrom and Strulovici (2009) (see also Shioura and Tamura (2015, Section 4) ). We say that a valuation function satisfies the SGS condition if the function satisfies the GS condition when each unit of items is regarded as being distinct. More precisely, for a valuation function f : [0, u] Z → R, we associate a functionf : {0, 1}Ñ → R by considering
Then, by definition, f satisfies the SGS condition if and only iff satisfies the GS condition. The SGS condition turns out to be equivalent to M ♮ -concavity (see Theorem 4.1 below) and also to the condition given by Murota and Tamura (2003) . Throughout this paper we assume the following conditions for all bidders' valuation functions
The assumption (A2) can be removed if we only need an ε-approximate equilibrium price vector, which is defined, for ε > 0, as a vector p such that ∥p − p * ∥ ∞ < ε for some equilibrium price vector p * . For such a problem, all results in this paper can be adapted easily with slight modifications.
Iterative Auctions.
An auction algorithm called the iterative auction (or Walrasian tâtonnement process, price adjustment process, dynamic auction, etc.) is studied extensively in the auction literature (Blumrosen and Nisan (2007) ; Cramton et al. (2006) ). An iterative auction finds an equilibrium price vector by iteratively updating a current price vector p using information on demand sets D j (p).
The most natural and popular iterative auction is ascending auction, in which the current price vector is increased monotonically. Ascending auction is a natural generalization of the classical English auction for a single item; in addition, it is natural from the economic point of view, and easy to understand and implement. For single-unit auctions with GS valuation functions, an ascending auction of Gul and Stacchetti (2000) can find an equilibrium price vector. Ausubel (2006) featured the Lyapunov function, which is defined by
where the vector u ∈ Z n + represents the numbers of available units for items in N . Use of the Lyapunov function is motivated by the fact that the set of excess supply vectors at a price vector p coincides with the set of subgradients of the Lyapunov function at p. The following important properties of the Lyapunov function are known (see Ausubel (2006) ; Sun and Yang (2009) The ascending auction algorithm in Ausubel (2006) , which is a reformulation of the ascending auction by Gul and Stacchetti (2000) , finds the minimal integral minimizer p * of the Lyapunov function in a finite number of iterations by updating the price vector in a greedy manner (see Section 4.2 for details). Ausubel (2006) also proposed a descending auction algorithm, which finds the maximal integral minimizer p * of the Lyapunov function by iteratively decreasing the price vector from an initial price vector. While the ascending and descending auction algorithms have various nice properties (see, e.g., Blumrosen and Nisan (2007) ; Cramton et al. (2006) ), they have a disadvantage that the initial price vector must be a lower (or upper) bound of the equilibrium price vector p * (or p * ). Ausubel (2006) proposed a third iterative auction, named "global Walrasian tâtonnement algorithm," which can start with an arbitrary price vector.
Preliminaries from Discrete Convex Analysis
We review the concepts of M ♮ -concave and L ♮ -convex functions and present some useful properties. See for more account of these concepts.
Definitions and Conjugacy.
A valuation function f j : [0, u] Z → R is said to be M ♮ -concave (read "Mnatural-concave") if it satisfies the following:
Here, we denote supp
for a vector x ∈ R n , χ i ∈ {0, 1} n is the characteristic vector of i ∈ N (i.e., the i-th unit vector), and χ 0 = 0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0) ⊤ . Let g : R n → R ∪ {+∞} be a polyhedral convex function, i.e., a convex function such that the epigraph
A polyhedral convex function g is said to be polyhedral L ♮ -convex if for every p, q ∈ dom g and every nonnegative λ ∈ R + , it holds that
where 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ⊤ , and for p, q ∈ R n , p∧q and p∨q denote, respectively, the vectors obtained by component-wise minimum and maximum of p and q. The property (5) is called translation submodularity.
Proposition 3.1 ). The sum of (two or more) integral polyhedral L ♮ -convex functions is also an integral polyhedral L ♮ -convex function.
We note that by the definition of integral polyhedral L ♮ -convex function, the minimization of an integral polyhedral L ♮ -convex function g : R n → R ∪ {+∞} can be reduced to the minimization of g on the integer lattice points Z n . It is easy to see that the restriction of g on the integer lattice points Z n satisfies the inequality (5) for every p, q ∈ Z n and every λ ∈ Z + . In general, a function g :
it satisfies the inequality (5) for every p, q ∈ Z n and every λ ∈ Z + .
The following conjugacy relation holds between M ♮ -concavity and L ♮ -convexity.
concave function if and only if the function
g : R n → R defined by g(p) = max{f (x) − p ⊤ x | x ∈ [0, u] Z } (p ∈ R n ) (6) is a polyhedral L ♮ -convex function. (ii) If f is an integer-valued function, then g is an integral polyhedral L ♮ - convex function.
Minimization Algorithms.
We consider minimization of an L ♮ -convex function g : Z n → R ∪ {+∞} defined on the integer lattice points. We denote
To the end of this section we assume that arg min Z g is nonempty and bounded. It is known that under such assumptions, arg min Z g has the uniquely determined minimal and maximal elements, which we denote by q * and q * , i.e., q * = the (uniquely determined) minimal minimizer of g,
This minimization problem can be solved by certain greedy (or steepest descent) algorithms ). We first consider a greedy algorithm such that the vector p is always increased. For X ⊆ N , we denote by
Algorithm GreedyUp
Step 0:
Step 1: Find a minimizer X ⊆ N of g(p + χ X ).
Step 2: If X = ∅, then output p and stop.
Step 3: Set p := p + χ X and go to Step 1.
A tight bound of the number of iterations of GreedyUp is known. Proposition 3.3 (Murota and Shioura (2014, Theorem 1.3 
)). The algorithm GreedyUp terminates by outputting a minimizer q * of g, and the number of updates of p is exactly equal to ∥q
Proof. Theorem 1.3 in Murota and Shioura (2014) implies that GreedyUp outputs a minimizer of g exactly in ∥q * − p • ∥ ∞ + 1 iterations. Since the last iteration in GreedyUp is used to check the optimality of p and does not update p itself, the number of updates of p is equal to ∥q
We note that the vector q * found by GreedyUp satisfies
Hence, Proposition 3.3 shows that the trajectory of the vector p generated by GreedyUp is the "shortest" path between the initial vector p • and the found minimizer q * of g. To find the minimal minimizer q * of g, a variant of GreedyUp called GreedyUpMinimal is considered, where Step 0 and Step 1 in GreedyUp are replaced with the following:
Step 1: Find the minimal minimizer X ⊆ N of g(p + χ X ).
That is, a minimal X is found in Step 1, which is uniquely determined by the L ♮ -convexity of g. GreedyUpMinimal outputs the minimal minimizer q * of g, as shown in the following proposition. In addition, a tight bound of the number of iterations can be given.
Proposition 3.4. The algorithm GreedyUpMinimal terminates by outputting the minimal minimizer q * of g, and the number of updates of p is exactly equal to ∥q
Proof. The behavior of GreedyUpMinimal applied to g is the same as that of GreedyUp applied to the function
with a sufficiently small positive ε. Indeed, we have the following equivalences:
This fact, together with Proposition 3.3, implies the claim of the proposition.
We consider another variant of GreedyUp called GreedyUpMaximal, where
Step 0 and Step 1 in GreedyUp are replaced with the following:
Step 1: Find the maximal minimizer X ⊆ N of g(p + χ X ).
That is, a maximal X is found in Step 1 instead of a minimal X, where a maximal minimizer X ⊆ N of g(p + χ X ) is uniquely determined by the L ♮ -convexity of g. This modification makes it possible to output the maximal minimizer of g instead of the minimal one.
Proposition 3.5. The algorithm GreedyUpMaximal terminates by outputting the maximal minimizer q * of g, and the number of updates of p is exactly equal to ∥q
Proof. The proof is quite similar to that for Proposition 3.4, where the function
Symmetrically, we can consider algorithms GreedyDownMaximal and GreedyDownMinimal, where the vector p is always decreased. Due to the L ♮ -convexity of g, minimal and maximal minimizers X ⊆ N of g(p − χ X ) in
Step 1 are uniquely determined.
Algorithm GreedyDownMaximal
Step 1: Find the minimal minimizer X ⊆ N of g(p − χ X ).
Step 3: Set p := p − χ X and go to Step 1. Proposition 3.6. The algorithm GreedyDownMaximal terminates by outputting the maximal minimizer q * of g, and the number of updates of p is exactly equal to ∥q
Proof. The claim follows immediately from Proposition 3.4 applied to the
The algorithm GreedyDownMinimal is the one obtained from GreedyDownMaximal by replacing Step 0 and Step 1 with the following:
Step 1: Find the maximal minimizer X ⊆ N of g(p − χ X ).
Proposition 3.7. The algorithm GreedyDownMinimal terminates by outputting the minimal minimizer q * of g, and the number of updates of p is exactly equal to ∥q
Proof. The claim follows immediately from Proposition 3.5 applied to the L ♮ -convex functionĝ(p) = g(−p).
Analysis of Iterative Auctions
In this section, we analyze the number of iterations of several iterative auction algorithms for finding an integral equilibrium price vector.
L ♮ -convexity of Lyapunov Function
We prove L ♮ -convexity of the indirect utility functions and the Lyapunov function. This observation plays a key role in the analysis of iterative auctions. We first note that the equivalence between the SGS condition and M ♮ -concavity.
the SGS condition if and only if it is M ♮ -concave.
This theorem can be shown as follows. By definition, the SGS condition for a function f : [0, u] Z → Z is equivalent to the GS condition forf : {0, 1}Ñ → Z given by (3). We can also show the following.
Proposition 4.2. A function
The proof is rather straightforward and therefore omitted. By Theorem 2.1, the functionf : {0, 1}Ñ → Z satisfies the GS condition if and only if it is an M ♮ -concave function. A combination of this fact with Proposition 4.2 yields Theorem 4.1.
We then prove L ♮ -convexity of the indirect utility function under the assumptions (A1) and (A2).
Theorem 4.3. The indirect utility function
V j : R n → R in (1) is an integral polyhedral L ♮ -convex
function if the valuation function f j satisfies the assumptions (A1) and (A2).
Proof. The assumption (A1) and Theorem 4.1 imply M ♮ -concavity of the valuation function f j . Hence, the indirect utility function V j is integral polyhedral L ♮ -convex by the conjugacy in Proposition 3.2 (ii) as well as the assumption (A2). On the basis of Corollary 4.4, we regard the Lyapunov function L, originally defined on R n , as a function on Z n . That is, the Lyapunov function
We denote by p * (resp., p * ) the (uniquely determined) minimal (resp., maximal) integral equilibrium price vector. In the following proposition we give an interval in which p * and p * are guaranteed to exist.
Proposition 4.5. Suppose that all bidders' valuation functions
The proof is outlined in Section 4.4.1.
Ascending and Descending Auction Algorithms
We first consider the ascending auction algorithm of Ausubel (2006) , which can be described as follows:
Algorithm AscendMinimal
Step 1:
Note that the algorithm AscendMinimal can be interpreted in auction terms as follows (see Ausubel (2006, Appendix B) for details about the implementation of Steps 2 and 3):
Step 0: The auctioneer sets p := p • , where
Step 1: The auctioneer asks the bidders to report their demand sets D j (p) (j ∈ M ), and finds the minimal minimizer X ⊆ N of L(p + χ X ).
Step 2: The auctioneer checks if X = ∅ by using the demand sets D j (p) (j ∈ M ); if X = ∅ holds, then the auctioneer reports p as the final price vector and stop.
Step 3: The auctioneer sets p := p + χ X and returns to Step 1. Theorem 4.6 (Ausubel (2006) Proof. The Lyapunov function L is an L ♮ -convex function by Corollary 4.4, and the algorithm AscendMinimal is nothing but the application of the algorithm GreedyUpMinimal to L. Hence, Proposition 3.4 implies that AscendMinimal outputs the minimal integral minimizer q * of L, which is the minimal integral equilibrium price vector p * by Theorem 2.2 (i). Moreover, the number of updates of the price vector in AscendMinimal is equal
Note that any algorithm that increases the price vector by a 0-1 vector in each iteration requires updates of the price vector at least ∥p * − p • ∥ ∞ times. Hence, the algorithm AscendMinimal is the fastest among all iterative auction algorithms of this type, and the trajectory of the price vector is a "shortest" path from the initial vector p • to the minimal equilibrium p * .
In addition, since ∥p * − p • ∥ ∞ ≤ max i∈N {a(i) − p • (i)} by Proposition 4.5, we can guarantee that the number of updates of p is at most max i∈N {a(i) − p • (i)}; note that this bound can be computed in advance before executing the algorithm.
To find the maximal equilibrium price vector p * instead of the minimal one, we consider another variant of the ascending auction algorithm 13 called AscendMaximal, where Step 0 and Step 1 in AscendMinimal are replaced with the following:
That is, a maximal X is found in Step 1 instead of a minimal X. This modification makes it possible to output the maximal equilibrium price vector p * . Similarly to AscendMinimal and AscendMaximal, we can consider two variants of the descending auction algorithm called DescendMaximal and DescendMinimal, where the price vector is decreased by a 0-1 vector. Note that the algorithm DescendMaximal is the same as the descending auction algorithm in Ausubel (2006) .
Algorithm DescendMaximal
given by (7)).
Step 3: Set p := p − χ X and go to Step 1. The algorithm DescendMinimal is obtained from DescendMaximal by replacing Step 0 and Step 1 with the following:
Step 0: Set p := p • , where p • ∈ Z n satisfies p • ≥ p * (e.g., p • = a with a ∈ Z n given by (7)).
The algorithms DescendMaximal and DescendMinimal are nothing but the application of the algorithms GreedyDownMaximal and GreedyDownMinimal to the Lyapunov function. Hence, the next theorems follow from Propositions 3.6 and 3.7. 
Two-Phase Auction Algorithms
An advantage of ascending and descending auction algorithms is that the price vector is updated monotonically, which is an important property from the viewpoint of auctions. They, however, have a drawback that the initial price vector should be a lower or upper bound for the integral equilibrium price vector p * (or p * ). In contrast, the following algorithms, which we call the two-phase auction algorithms, can start with any initial price vector and find an equilibrium. Therefore, the number of iterations can be small if we can choose an initial vector that is close to an equilibrium.
As we see below, a two-phase auction algorithm is an application of an ascending auction algorithm with an arbitrary initial vector, followed by a descending auction algorithm. We first present a variant of the two-phase auction algorithm obtained from the combination of AscendMinimal and DescendMinimal, which always outputs the minimal equilibrium price vector p *
Algorithm TwoPhaseMinMin
Step 0: Set p := p • , where p • ∈ Z n is any vector (to be chosen appropriately in practice). Go to Ascending Phase. Ascending Phase:
Step A1: Find the minimal minimizer X ⊆ N of L(p + χ X ).
Step A2: If X = ∅, then go to Descending Phase.
Step A3: Set p := p + χ X and go to Step A1. Descending Phase:
Step D1: Find the maximal minimizer X ⊆ N of L(p − χ X ).
Step D2: If X = ∅, then output p and stop.
Step D3: Set p := p − χ X and go to Step D1.
To analyze the number of iterations required by TwoPhaseMinMin, we define η(p, q) = ∥p − q∥
where ∥p−q∥
The proof of the next theorem is given in Section 4.4.2. We can consider another variant of the two-phase auction algorithm, to be called TwoPhaseMinMax, which is the combination of AscendMinimal and DescendMaximal. That is, TwoPhaseMinMax is the algorithm obtained by replacing Step D1 in TwoPhaseMinMin with the following:
Step D1: Find the minimal minimizer X ⊆ N of L(p − χ X ).
A version of the algorithm TwoPhaseMinMax specialized to valuation functions on {0, 1} n coincides with the one in Sun and Yang (2009) . TwoPhaseMinMax is also similar to the "global Walrasian tâtonnement algorithm" in Ausubel (2006) , which repeats ascending and descending phases until some equilibrium p * is found, where p * is not necessarily equal to p * or p * . Our analysis shows that the global Walrasian tâtonnement algorithm terminates after only one ascending phase and only one descending phase; see also Sun and Yang (2009) . In other words, the behavior of the global Walrasian tâtonnement algorithm coincides with that of TwoPhaseMinMax.
Theorem 4.13. Starting from any integral vector p • , the algorithm TwoPhaseMinMax terminates by outputting some integral equilibrium price vector p * , and the number of updates of the price vector in the ascending phase is at most η(p • , p * ) and that in the descending phase is at most 2η(p • , p * ).
The proof of this theorem is given in Section 4.4.3.
Remark 4.14. We may also consider other two-phase auction algorithms TwoPhaseMaxMin and TwoPhaseMaxMax. The former consists of AscendMaximal and DescendMinimal, and the latter consists of AscendMaximal and DescendMaximal. It can be shown that TwoPhaseMaxMin (resp., TwoPhaseMaxMax) finds the minimal integral equilibrium price vector p * (resp., the maximal integral equilibrium price vector p * ); the proof is similar to that for Theorem 4.12 and omitted. 2 Remark 4.15. We point out that the iterative auction algorithms considered in this section use linear and anonymous pricing rule, meaning that the price of any bundle x of goods is equal to p ⊤ x and is the same for all bidders. On the other hand, so-called combinatorial auction algorithms use nonlinear and discriminatory pricing rule, i.e., the price p(x, i) of a bundle x of goods depends on x and bidder i and is nonlinear. It is shown that various iterative auction algorithms using the latter pricing rule can be used to find (possibly nonlinear and discriminatory) equilibrium prices even if valuation functions are more general than those with SGS condition (see, e.g., Cramton et al. 
(i) < u(i), it holds that
Let p * ∈ R n be an equilibrium price vector. Let
where
This inequality can be rewritten as
where the last inequality is by the monotonicity assumption (A0) for f j . We then show that p
where the second inequality is by Lemma 4.16 and the third by the definition (7) of a(i).
Proof of Theorem 4.12 for Algorithm TwoPhaseMinMin.
The key of the proof is the following property of L ♮ -convex functions. Recall that the Lyapunov function is regarded as a function defined on Z n .
Lemma 4.17 (Murota (2003, Theorem 7.7) ). Let g :
We show several lemmas below, from which Theorem 4.12 follows. Let p be the price vector at the end of the ascending phase andp be the output of the algorithm. Recall that p * denotes the (unique) minimal integral equilibrium price vector, which is also the (unique) minimal minimizer of the Lyapunov function L by Theorem 2.2. Proof. The behavior of the ascending phase is the same as that of the algorithm AscendMinimal applied to the functionL :
which is also an L ♮ -convex function. Theorem 4.7 implies that in the ascending phase the number of updates of the price vector p is equal to ∥p − p • ∥ ∞ , andp is the minimal minimizer of the functionL, i.e.,p is the minimal
We now provep ≥ p * . Assume, to the contrary, thatp ̸ ≥ p * . Then, we have supp + (p * −p) ̸ = ∅, and therefore Lemma 4.17 implies that
where X = arg max i∈N {p
We then assume that supp Let t ∈ X be an element withp(t) = p • (t). Then, it holds that
Hence, all the inequalities in this formula hold with equality. In particular, we have
where the last equality is by supp
From this equation follows that for every k ∈ N , we havê 
where the last inequality is by (8) 
Proof. The behavior of the descending phase is the same as that of the algorithm DescendMaximal applied to the functionĽ :
which is also an L ♮ -convex function. Theorem 4.10 implies that in the descending phase the number of updates of the price vector p is equal to ∥p * −p∥ ∞ , and p * is the maximal minimizer of the functionĽ, i.e., p * is the maximal vector in arg min{L(p) | p ∈ Z n , p ≤p}. Since p * ≤p holds by Lemma 4.18, we have
i.e., p * is a minimizer of L. By Theorem 2.2 (i), p * is an equilibrium price vector. We have
where the second inequality is by (8).
The rest of the proof is the same as that for Lemma 4.19, where p * should be replaced with p * .
Connection to Unit-Demand Auction
The unit-demand auction model, where each bidder is interested in getting at most one item, is discussed extensively in the literature (see, e.g., ; Andersson and Erlanson (2013) ; Demange et al. (1986) ; Mishra and Parkes (2009); Mo et al. (1988); Sankaran (1994) ). The model is known to be a special case of the general model with gross substitutes valuations considered in the previous sections. The objective of this section is to offer a unified treatment by showing that the general algorithms AscendMinimal, DescendMinimal, and TwoPhaseMinMin, when applied to the unitdemand auction model, coincide with existing fundamental iterative auction algorithms for the unit-demand auction model.
Unit-Demand Auction Model and Relationship with General Model
We explain the unit-demand auction model considered in this section, and show the relationship with the general auction model discussed in the previous sections. The unit-demand auction model is a special case of the single-unit auction model, where each bidder is interested in getting at most one item, i.e., each bidder is a unit-demand bidder. This means that even if a bidder can get multiple items, the bidder is interested in only one item.
As in the previous sections, we denote by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} the set of items and by M = {1, 2, . . . , m} the set of bidders. We assume, without loss of generality, that each type of item is available in only one unit. For each item i and each bidder j, we denote by v j (i) ∈ R + the valuation of item i by bidder j. We define a valuation function f j : {0, 1} n → R + of bidder j by
(11) Through the one-to-one correspondence between 0-1 vectors and subsets of N , we identify the valuation function f j in (11) defined on 0-1 vectors with the following set function defined on subsets of N :
A valuation function of this form is often called a unit-demand valuation (see, e.g., Cramton et al. (2006, Section 9.2 .2) and Blumrosen and Nisan (2007, Definition 11.17) ). It is known that a unit-demand valuation is a typical example of gross substitutes valuation.
Theorem 5.1 (Gul and Stacchetti (1999) ). Valuation function f j : {0, 1} n → R given by (11) satisfies the GS condition (and also the SGS condition).
Hence, the unit-demand auction model is a special case of the general model with gross substitutes valuations discussed in the previous sections, and all of the results there can be applied to the unit-demand auction model. To be consistent with (12), we rewrite the definition of the demand set D j (p) in (2) associated with a valuation function f j in terms of set functions, i.e.,
, where 0 denotes an artificial item which has no value (i.e., v j (0) = 0 for j ∈ M ) and is available in infinite number of units. For each bidder j and a price vector p ∈ R n + , we define a set D j (p) by
where we put p(0) = 0 for convenience. An assignment is a function π : M → N 0 , and an assignment π is said to be feasible if each item in N appears at most once in {π(j) | j ∈ M } (the artificial item 0 may appear more than once). A price vector p * ∈ R n is said to be a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if there exists a feasible assignment π :
This definition of Walrasian equilibrium price vector is consistent with the definition given in Introduction in the case of unit-demand auction model. This fact, which seems to be well known among experts, is stated in the following proposition, where a proof is given in Appendix for completeness.
Proposition 5.2. For a price vector
p ∈ R n + , there exists a feasible assign- ment π : M → N 0 such that π(j) ∈ D j (p) for every j ∈ M and p(i) = 0 for every i ∈ N \ {π(j) | j ∈ M } if
and only if there exists a partition
{X 1 , . . . , X m } of N such that X j ∈ D j (p) (possibly X j = ∅) for every j ∈ M .
Review of Unit-Demand Auction Algorithms
In this section we review three iterative auction algorithms for the unitdemand auction model: Vickrey-English auction by Demange et al. (1986) , Vickrey-Dutch auction by Mishra and Parkes (2009) , and Vickrey-EnglishDutch auction by Andersson and Erlanson (2013) . The description of the algorithms given below basically follows and Andersson and Erlanson (2013) . In the following, we assume that valuation v j (i) for bidder j and item i is given by a nonnegative integer; this implies, in particular, that the valuation function f j for j ∈ M is an integer-valued function, and therefore there exists an integral equilibrium price vector by Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 4.4.
For a price vector p ∈ R n + and an item set Y ⊆ N , we define The Vickrey-English auction algorithm due to Mo et al. (1988) and Sankaran (1994) , which is a variant of the one in Demange et al. (1986) , is described as follows:
Algorithm Vickrey English
Step 0: Set p := p • , where p • ∈ Z n + satisfies p • ≤ p * for the minimal equilibrium price vector p * (e.g., p • = 0).
Step 1: Find the maximal set X ⊆ N in excess demand at price p.
Step 3: Set p := p + χ X and go to Step 1. 2
To describe the Vickrey-Dutch auction algorithm, we need variants of the sets D j (p) and O(Y, p) by taking the positivity of prices (i.e., positive or zero) into account as follows:
A set X ⊆ N is said to be in positive excess demand at price p if it satisfies X ⊆ supp + (p) and
The following proposition can be proved in a similar way.
Proposition 5.4 (cf. Andersson and Erlanson (2013, Theorem 2) 
Algorithm Vickrey Dutch
Step 0: Set p := p • , where p • ∈ Z n + satisfies p • ≥ p * for the minimal equilibrium price vector p * .
Step 1: Find the maximal set Z ⊆ N in positive excess demand at price p, and put X = supp + (p) \ Z.
Step 3: Set p := p − χ X and go to Step 1.
2
Vickrey-English-Dutch auction by Andersson and Erlanson (2013) , which is a combination of Vickrey-English auction and Vickrey-Dutch auction, is described as follows.
Algorithm Vickrey English Dutch
Step 0: Set p := p • , where p • ∈ Z n is any vector (to be chosen appropriately in practice). Go to Step E1.
Step E1: Find the maximal set X ⊆ N in excess demand at price p.
Step E2: If X = ∅, then go to Step D1.
Step E3: Set p := p + χ X and go to Step E1.
Step D1: Find the maximal set Z ⊆ N in positive excess demand at price p, and put X = supp + (p) \ Z.
Analysis of Unit-Demand Auction Algorithms
We first show that the unit-demand auction algorithms explained above coincide with the iterative auction algorithms in Section 4 applied to valuation functions f j given by (11). 
The proof of Lemma 5.6 is given in Section 5.4.
A combination of Theorem 5.5 above and Theorems 4.7, 4.11, and 4.12 in Section 4 yields the following (exact or upper) bounds on the number of iterations in the unit-demand auction algorithms. The claims (i) and (ii) given below are already shown in Andersson and Erlanson (2013 
Proof of Lemma 5.6

Proof of Lemma 5.6 (i).
We first prove Lemma 5.6 (i).
Proof. We first show the following equation:
We have
On the other hand, for every nonempty
, from which follows that
Hence, (14) holds.
From (14) follows that
Therefore, it holds that
To establish a connection between the minimal minimizer of L(p+χ X )− L(p) and the maximal set in excess demand, it is convenient to use a directed graph G defined as follows. For a price vector p ∈ Z n + , we consider a directed graph G = (V, E) with the vertex set V = {s, t} ∪ M ∪ N 0 and the edge set
For each edge (u, v) ∈ E, we define its capacity c (u, v) as
Note that edge set E is dependent on price vector p. A vertex partition (S, V \ S) with s ∈ S and t ∈ V \ S is called an s-t cut, and its the capacity c(S, V \ S) is defined as
c (u, v) ,
An s-t cut of G is said to be minimum if it has the minimum capacity among all s-t cuts.
For X ⊆ N , define a vertex set K(X) by
is an s-t cut. The next lemma shows that the capacity of (K(X), V \ K(X)) minus m (= |M |) is equal to the right-hand side of (13), and that a minimum s-t cut is given by (K(X), V \ K(X)) for some X.
In particular, we have c(
Proof. We first prove (i). By the definition of edge set E, there exists no
We then prove (ii). Suppose that there exists some j ∈ S ∩ M such that
Using claim (i) above we obtain that
c(S, V \ S) = |X| − |S ∩ M | + m > |X| − |O(X, p)| + m = c(K(X), V \ K(X)).
It follows from Lemmas 5.8 and 5.9 that a set X ⊆ N is a minimizer of the value L(p + χ X ) − L(p) if and only if (K(X), V \ K(X)) is a minimum s-t cut of the graph G.
Our next step is to relate minimal such X to the maximal set in excess demand.
Lemma 5.10. Let X ⊆ N be the (uniquely determined) minimal set such that (K(X), V \ K(X)) is a minimum s-t cut of the graph G. Then, X is the maximal set in excess demand at price p.
Proof. We first show that X is in excess demand at price p, i. where Lemma 5.9 (i) is used. Since (K(X), V \ K(X)) is an s-t cut with the minimum capacity and X ′ X, the minimality of X implies |Z| > |Y |. Hence, X is in excess demand at price p.
To show that X is the unique maximal set among all sets in excess demand, we assume, to the contrary, that there exists some setX X in excess demand (cf. Proposition 5 a contradiction to the fact that (K(X), V \K(X)) is a minimum s-t cut of G. Therefore, X is the unique maximal set among all sets in excess demand.
From the discussion above, we see that a set X ⊆ N is the minimal minimizer of the value L(p + χ X ) − L(p) if and only if X is the maximal set in excess demand at price p. Thus, Lemma 5.6 (i) holds.
Proof of Lemma 5.6 (ii).
The proof of Lemma 5.6 (ii) given below is similar to that for Lemma 5.6 (i). 
Proof. We have V j (p) = max i∈N 0 {v j (i) − p(i)} by (14). Therefore, it holds that
from which follows that This concludes the proof.
To relate the minimal minimizer X of L(p−χ X )−L(p) with the maximal set in positive excess demand, we use a directed graph G + = (V + , E + ) with the vertex set V + = {s, t} ∪ M ∪ supp + (p) and the edge set
That is, the graph G + is a subgraph of the graph G defined in Section 5. For Z ⊆ N , a vertex set K + (Z) is defined by
Note that (K + (Z), V + \ K + (Z)) is an s-t cut. The next lemma shows that the capacity of (K + (Z), V + \K + (Z)) minus |supp + (p)| is equal to the righthand sides of (15) and (16) with X = supp + (p) \ Z, and that a minimum s-t cut is given by (K + (Z), V + \ K + (Z)) for some Z. Proof. The proof is essentially the same as that for Lemma 5.9 and therefore omitted.
It follows from Lemmas 5.11 and 5.12 that a set X ⊆ supp + (p) is a minimizer of the value L(p − χ X ) − L(p) if and only if (K + (Z), V + \ K + (Z)) is a minimum s-t cut of the graph G + for Z = supp + (p) \ X. Our next step is to relate minimal such Z to the maximal set in positive excess demand. Proof. The proof is quite similar to that for Lemma 5.10 and therefore omitted.
From the discussion above, the following equivalence holds for X ⊆ supp + (p) and Z = supp + (p) \ X: X is the maximal minimizer of the value L(p − χ X ) − L(p) ⇐⇒ Z is the minimal set such that (K(Z), V + \ K(Z)) is a minimum s-t cut of the graph G + ⇐⇒ Z is the maximal set in positive excess demand at price p.
Thus, Lemma 5.6 (ii) holds.
